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court

granting summary judgment on the settlement negotiation contract.
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Jay Knowlton and his wife Teresa, after Jay's long service with the Las Vegas city Police
Department, decided that upon retirement they wanted to trade the hectic life of the city for the
relaxation that a rural setting would provide to them. They visited the

Rup~rt,

Idaho, area and after

looking at different parcels of property, they were introduced to Cary Hamilton who showed them a
7 acre parcel of rnY',""P,,,, which he had for sale.
7 acre parcel

was a 2 acre

property which

was currently in foreclosure and through
to
foreclosed

prop~rty

from

both parcels of

Mr.
were

bank, and thereafter the KnowItons entered into

Hami Iton to purchase the 7 acre lot. The parties
to

14C'-'1l11.-11t"

as a down

agr~(:d

a modular
Mrs.

to
contract with

upon a purchase price of $31,250. The
then

an

$25,250 at

month.
Even though this arrangement had been made, the Knowltons decided to pay the balance of
the property, and on April 16, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton tendered a check for $23,421 for the
balance owed on the 7 acre parceL A check drawn on the personal account ofthe Knowltons was
delivered to Hamilton on this date, and the deed was thereafter given to the KnowItons for the 7
acre parcel by Hamilton. On April 22, 2004, Theresa Hamilton recorded the deed in Minidoka
County.
Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton had moved to Idaho and their desire was to build a dream home
upon the property that they had purchased. In furtherance of this dream, after Teresa recorded the
deed on April 22, 2004, she immediately went to the Minidoka County zoning and planning office
5

to start the process

securmg

to

and then allow their daughter to

anew

UUJlLU1"H5

pennits for
the modular home on the 2 acre

parcel that they had also recently purchased.
However, when Teresa made inquiries at the planning and zoning office with regard to
securing building pennits for the 7 acre parcel property, she was infonned by Paul Aston, Minidoka
County planning and zoning department head, that building pennits could not be issued. Mr. Aston
explained that the 2 acre parcel of property on which
illegally subdivided from the original lot by

Hamilton. Since

Hamilton on the subdivision where the 7 and 2 acre
allow for splitting of the 2 acre parcel

modular home was situated, had been
original plat filed

of property had not been amended to

property, County ordinance would not allow construction

on the 7 acre lot. In other words, the 7 and 2 acre plots, according to the planning and zoning
ordinances were one lot, and would have to remain so, unless the county planning and zoning laws
pennitted such a change. Consequently, if the Knowltons wanted to sell the 2 acre plot, and then
build their dream home on the remaining 7 acres, they would not b~ able to separate both parcels of
property into two different lots under the County ordinances. Mr. Hamilton's activities were in
violation of the Minidoka County ordinances and constituted misdemeanor offenses. However, even
though Minidoka County was aware of the illegal subdivision, no action had been taken against Mr.
Hamilton.
Realizing that their plan had gone awry, the Knowltons put a stop payment on the check for
$23,421 on April 22, 2004. The Knowltons felt that they had been defrauded, however, nothing was
done with regard to this matter until Hamilton filed suit on April 13,2008. On September 9, 2009,
on the day set for trial, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. The agreed-upon settlement
required Hamilton to go through the planning and zoning process to correct the illegal subdivision,
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Knowltons were to "support, ... by appearing at any hearings
commissioners or

.LVJlHHi",

commlssIOn or

,,1

might

necessary

Furthermore the Knowltons were also

the obligation to "be supportive and assist and cooperate as necessary to get the subdivision
approved. ,,2
Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton signed the application and the process was commenced. However,
and Mrs. Knowlton were not given a copy of the proposed plat for the subdivision, and after
their own copy of the plat, they noted the placement of an easement for a driveway and
another easement for delivery of

water.

and Mrs.

DfCtDo:sea easements, and noted their objection to the plat

were not consulted on
informing

Hamilton of that

hearing was set in front of the Minidoka County planning and zoning

on

18, 2010, to address the issue of the proposed changes to this property. Mr. and
Knowlton were not given notice of the hearing, nor was notice of the hearing posted on their
property as required by County ordinance. 3 Consequently,

and Mrs. Knowlton did not appear at

the hearing and were not able to voice their approval or disapproval of the plat.
In spite of the Knowltons absence from the planning and zoning hearing, Mr. Hamilton went
forward with the application. Mr. and Mrs. Knowlton were upset that they heard about the hearing
secondhand, and realizing that they had once again been ignored or deceived by Mr. Hamilton, they
withdrew their support for the application by way of a letter dated February 22, 2010.
Hamilton thereafter filed to foreclose upon his lien, but the court thereafter ordered that the
matter should be taking care of through amendment to the complaint. After the complaint was
amended, Hamilton filed a motion for summary judgment upon the settlement agreement. After

1 Transcript

at 5.
1d.
3 Affidavit of Jay Knowlton; see generally Minidoka County Subdivision Ordinances 3.3G 1-4.
2

7

court granted

0CWHU.H.U

material fact

Hamilton finding

judgment
to

was no

matter

agreement.

8

With regard to summary judgment, it is only appropriate, if after examining

pleadings,

depositions, admissions, along with any affidavits, the court finds that "there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw..,4 If there
are controverted facts, they are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party.5 Likewise,
all inferences that can be made from the
summary judgment. 6 The burden
material
v<,")VLJlULJl,.

is upon the

7

must

made in favor of the party opposing the

establishing that
"the

minds might reach different conclusions, a

is no genuine issue

contains conflicting inferences or
judgment must

denied. liS

to
contract

Even though the court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to
the Knowltons alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the Knowltons dispute that finding in its
entirety. The focus of the court was on its finding that the Knowltons had frustrated the purpose of
the contract, and consequently, Hamilton did not have the opportunity to cure the defect in his
performance which consequently defeated the purpose of the parties. 9 In other words, the court
ruled that the Knowltons actions prevented the plaintiffs performance of the contract.

4I.R.C.P. 56 (e).
5G

& M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-517, 808 P.2d 851,853-854 (1991).

1d.
1d.
8 1d.
6

7

9

Memorandum Decision Clerks Record at 74.

9

The court stated that the
"successfull y subdivide the property." 10

settlement agreement was to
to accomplish this fundamental purpose,

parties had agreed to that the Knowltons would be "supportive and assist us and cooperate as
necessary to get the subdivision approved." II These were the terms which were set into the record
by the parties, as the parameters to guide the parties to the ultimate end of successfully subdivide in
the property.

the court's decision indicates that the Knowltons cooperation essentially

consisted of agreeing to everything that Hamilton proposed.
The court's ruling is speculative in ruling that
nr(jce~:;s

could

the affidavit of

been

Knowltons rejection

This part of the decision

Knowlton, which was, that Hamilton had

placement of the easements, and had failed to

application

important fact set forth in
contacted with regard to the

into account the Knowltons' concerns. The court,

without any supporting evidence, did not find this to be a material issue and the court thereafter
stated that subdivision plans, were by inference workable. The location of the easements was not a
material factor according to the court.
Furthermore, the court did not find that the lack of notice to the Knowltons was a material
factor justifying the Knowltons actions. Once again, the court stated, without any supporting facts,
that the matter could be resolved by further hearing in front ofthe commission, if the KnowItons
were willing to cooperate.

A. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a reciprocal and the obligation to
fulfill the terms of the contract falls on both parties equally.
The flaw in the court's reasoning centers on one salient fact: that is, that the court's definition
of cooperation seems to be one in which the Knowltons were to acquiesce to everything that Mr.

10

11

Id. At 73.
Trial Transcript at 9.

10

this matter. It is a statement of the

did
of

to hearings were important factors to

that

placement

easements and

Knowltons.

with Mr. Hamilton was that he had been less than forthright about his dealings with them with
regard to this property. Ignoring their wishes with regard to the placement of easements, along with
failure to provide notice of the hearings, only heightened their suspicion that Mr. Knowlton was
doing whatever

wanted to do in order to accomplish his purpose. Such actions

not require the

cooperation of the Knowltons, as they are only being asked to follow or go along with the terms
which are being dictated to them.
All contractual performance is governed by a
is "implied by

of good faith and fair dealing"

and 'requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations

agreement [.]"ol2 This covenant of good faith and fair dealing is reciprocal, that is,

by
both

parties are required to perform their contractual duties pursuant to this covenant. J3 Even though this
is the state

the law with regard to contractual obligations, according to the court's ruling,

Hamilton's shortcomings with regard to his performance of the contract, are to be excused, while the
Knowltons are to be punished for their "lack of cooperation." Such was the finding of the court,
although, there was little effort on the part of Hamilton to remedy the defects in the process, even
though he had been informed of the Knowltons' objections prior to the hearing.
It has been further recognized that

i]f a promisor prevents or hinders the occurrence of a condition, or the performance or return
promise, and the condition would have occurred or the performance of the return promise
been rendered except for such prevention or hindrance, the condition is excused and the
actual or threatened performance of the return promise does not discharge a promisor's duty.

Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208,217,177 P.3d 955, 964 (2007),
quoting Steiner v. Ziegler-Tamura Ltd., Co. 138 Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595, 599 (2002).
13
Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal.App.3d 805, 820, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 229 (1988).
12

11

is

As

been previously argued

the Knowltons, a covenant

good faith and fair dealing

is a reciprocal obligation. The Knowltons argue that Hamilton was also conducting himself in such
a way that he was hindering or interfering with their performance of the contract by not addressing

the easements issue and by failing to provide notice to them of hearings on the application as
required

Minidoka ordnance.

failing to address

Knowltons' concerns, as well as

proceeding with the application at the planning and zoning hearing without
present, is conduct which can be construed as justification for the
this

of the litigation, it

be

parties constituted a breach of
rH",~n('>l"

All of this

actions.

at

the actions

a trier of
settlement

avenue to make such a determination based upon the

Knowltons

UI",".H'-'llH

the

is not the

this case.

to one inescapable conclusion, that there is a genuine issue of material fact

with regard to the performance of this contract by both parties. It is pure speculation on the part of
the court that Hamilton's defects and performance could have been cured in the future. Hamilton
had been informed of the problems with regard to the easements and had done nothing, and there
was no evidence put into the record in support of the motion for summary judgment by Hamilton,
that this particular problem will be addressed in the future. Consequently, by weighing all the facts,
it is just as reasonable to suppose that Hamilton's performance under the contract would not be
cured in the future. The court's decision is purely speculative.
Hamilton argues that the placement of easements was not a material issue, as Paul Aston, in
his deposition, stated that the easements could be changed later. This argument is fallacious on two

14

In Re Penn Traffic Company, 322 B.R. 63, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), quoting Restatement (First) of Contracts § 295

(1932)

12

grounds: one,

placement

easements was a

addressed on the plat and in the application process.

that
gets

wanted to
court and

to

Hamilton, regarded the Knowltons cooperation under the terms of the settlement agreement, to be
acquiescence to whatever Hamilton decided to do on the application. Once again, without flogging
a dead horse, such a definition of cooperation smacks more of a mandatory obligation requiring the
Knowltons to go along with Hamilton's desires or wishes.
Second, Ashton also testified that in order to change the location
approval ofthe plat and the subdivision, the Knowltons would
gaining approval through planning and zoning for changes to

the easements after

to go back through the process
plat

easements. IS This would require the Knowltons to undertake additional
along with money, to

location

to

of time and

the changes. Consequently to argue that the location

the

easements was not material is just not true.
All of the foregoing argument boils down to one overarching point that under these
are genuine issues of material fact which should have been addressed at trial. The court's
reliance upon its finding that the placement of the easements was not a material breach, along with
the court's speculation that Hamilton's breach of his obligations under the contract could have been
cured, is erroneous. Summary judgment should not have been granted under these facts.
B. Nonperformance of the contract by both parties mandates that the matter be reset

for trial.
The court recognized that if the parties could not perform the contract and that the
appropriate remedy would be to have the matter reset for triaL]6 Under the facts and circumstances
laid out by the KnowItons in this case, the appropriate remedy in this matter would be to have the

15
16

Paul Aston deposition at 35-37. Transcript at the 97.
Transcript at 8.

13

case set for trial in its entirety.
this matter.

court creates a problematic resolution of

property

and placing upon the

obligation to

pay the $23,421, the court gave an official imprimatur to an illegal contract.
It should be noted that a "contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter

prohibited by statute is illegaL unenforceable, and void.,,17 In this case, Hamilton performed a
subdivision of the property in question, which was contrary to

Hamilton did not disclose the

infirmity created by his actions, and the Knowltons purchased the property believing that they could
secure building permits to build an additional house on the property.
Additionally, as a matter of public policy, the illegality doctrine
the parties are not in pari delicto or
duress are

then relief may

those circumstances
grunted to the innocent

not be enforceable
fraud,undueinfluence,or
18

this context, the

Knowltons argue that if the court allows enforcement of this illegally based contract for sale ofreul
property, the Respondents would be unjustly enriched. When a party receives a benefit to which he
is not entitled, then that person is enriched. 19

stated above, the Knowltons are innocent parties to

this transaction, and they are entitled to the relief which they are seeking.
This case bears some similarities to the case of Kunz v. Lobo Lodge. Inc. 133 Idaho 608, 990
P. 2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999). In that case, the Plaintiff petitioned the court to enforce a lease which
was based upon the placement of billboards, which was in contravention of municipal law. The
District Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants based upon the unenforceability of the
illegal contract. The court stated that "a contract 'which is made for the purpose of furthering any
matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void. This rule applies to every contract which is founded

Wernecke v. Ste. Maries Joint School District Number 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2009).
Wernecke, at 147 Idaho ---,207 P.3d at 1018, fn.12.
19 Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,200 P.3d 1153, 1162 (2009).
17
18

14

on a transaction
court continued

se,

or

is prohibited

statute, on

ground of public policy. ",20

stating that

no principle of law is better settled than that a party to any legal contract cannot come into a
court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out; ... the law in short will not aid
either party to an illegal contract; it leaves the parties where it finds them. The general rule
21
is the same at law and in equity, and whether the contract is executory or executed.
There is no dispute in the factual record that the subdivision performed by Hamilton was
illegal and in violation of Minidoka

ordnance. For this reason, the settlement agreement

the creation of a new plat and submission of the same to the planning
commission in
The settlement
this illegality.

to have official approval
ifit had

zonmg
back in 2001.22

the

through without any '-'~"'H!JU

as has been explained in its

Hamilton

with

to

regard to notice to the Knowltons, as well as his deaf ear to their concern with

to the

placement of easements. These problems with the settlement agreement resulted in the actions
undertaken by the Knowltons. However, by thereafter finding that the Knowltons must pay
Hamilton, the court is enforcing an illegal contract.

more appropriate resolution would have been

to set the matter for trial for resolution on all of the claims of both parties.

20 Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc. 133 Idaho 608, 612, 990 P. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999) quoting Porter v. Canyon County
Farmer's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928).
21 Kunz, 133 Idaho at 612,990 P. 2d at 1223, quoting Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 548, 186 P. 2d 494, 498
(1947), quoting 17 c.J.S. Contracts § 272.

22

See Deposition of Paul Aston at 34.
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that

granting summary judgment, and

court

the Appellants petition this court to so find and to remand this matter for triaL

this

I

of August, 2011.

certify that on this _._

August,

11, I

foregoing

to the attorney for the Defendant-Respondent by depositing a copy thereof in the United
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

JEFF STOKER, CHARTERED, P.O.
PO BOX 1597
TWIN FALLS, ID M83303-1597
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